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SURVIVOR BENEFITS AND THE GENDER TAX GAP 






Since its inception, the traditional form of providing survivor benefits within public pension 
schemes has lost much of its legitimacy. As a result of fundamental changes in marriage 
behaviour and the typical division of labour between married spouses, offering non-
contributory benefits of this kind could be seen as inequitable. Since these benefits usually 
substitute for non-derived pension entitlements based on the surviving spouse’s own 
contributions, they can also lead to incentive effects, especially for married women with some 
degree of labour-force attachment, that appear to be far from optimal. The present paper 
highlights this problem referring to institutional details and empirical results related to 
Germany and shows how it could be resolved by jointly annuitizing a given couple’s pension 
entitlements. 
JEL Code: H55, J16, J22. 
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Next to old-age and disability pensions, survivor beneﬁts form part of the tra-
ditional beneﬁt package provided by most existing public pension schemes. In
the German Statutory Pension Scheme, the earliest public pension scheme in
the industrialized world, widows’ and orphans’ pensions were introduced with
a small delay (in 1904, while the scheme as such was set up in 1889; see Frerich
and Frey 1993). But since the early 20th century, they are a standard type of
beneﬁts that spouses and young children who outlive their breadwinners are
entitled to receive without any very restrictive qualifying conditions and with-
out the insured individual having paid any other than the regular contributions.
Later on, this design has been exported to many other countries. In most cases,
for reasons of legal non-discrimination, widowers’ pensions have been introduced
more recently as an additional category of survivor beneﬁts.1
The present paper mainly concentrates on widows’ pensions and on the stan-
dard case where these are paid to women who have reached, or are close to, their
own retirement phase. The problems it is going to highlight are relevant for pen-
sions paid to partners, not children, of an insured individual and they relate to
labour supply decisions taken by these partners during earlier stages of their
life cycle. Orphans’ pensions as well as pensions paid to young mothers who
have to take care of small children are thus out of our focus. Also, in spite
of legal entitlements that are basically uniform now, the proportion of widow-
ers’ pensions to widows’ pensions is usually insigniﬁcant.2 The reasons for this
asymmetry are that women are usually younger than their husbands; that, in
any case, their life expectancy is signiﬁcantly longer; and that their husbands
are still typically acting as primary earners, building up own pension entitle-
ments by which their claims on widowers’ pensions are reduced and often fall
to zero, even if the relevant contingency arises.
Over the last decades, there has nonetheless been a substantial change in
t h ed i v i s i o no fl a b o u rb e t w e e nw o m e na n dm e nw i t h i nag i v e nh o u s e h o l d ,w i t ha
continuous increase in female labour-force participation and a notable reduction
in the gender wage gap observed earlier on. As a result of these changes that
are common across most industrialized countries, providing special beneﬁts for
surviving spouses has become more and more obsolete. Figure 1 illustrates
these trends, comparing labour-force participation rates and wages for females
and males in West Germany, as well as their impact on average, non-derived
pension entitlements that is becoming eﬀective, with some delay, within the
German Statutory Pension Scheme.
1For an up-to-date survey of relevant rules for the countries of the EU-15, the US, and
Switzerland, see Fenge et al. (2003, Section 1.4.4).
292.7% of all widows’ and widowers’ pensions paid out by the German Statutory Pension
Scheme eﬀectively accrue to widows, their average monthly amount being about 2.5 times
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Fig. 1: Labour-force participation, wages and pension beneﬁts of women
(West-Germany, 1960—2000)
In the German debate, the main objections to how survivor beneﬁts are
currently being assessed are (i) that they can lead to over-provision in cases of
married individuals where both partners have built up some amount of pension
entitlements based on own contributions; (ii) that they do not really substitute
for rules addressing a suﬃcient level of beneﬁts for parents, especially mothers,
who spent a lot of time and other resources on rearing children, thus contribut-
ing to the future funding of pay-as-you-go public pension schemes; (iii)t h a t
they have ceased to be a fair insurance against the risk of leaving behind depen-
dant family members and have instead become a mechanism for redistributing
resources from those who never marry to married couples with wives who are
not working.
If the traditional form of providing survivor beneﬁts has come under attack
because of its redistributive features, the incentive eﬀects should have become
problematic as well. This is what the present paper mainly looks at, concen-
trating on how pension entitlements typically collected in the German Statutory
Pension Scheme aﬀect the work incentives for married females vs males. An im-
portant intermediate result is that the “implicit wage tax” that is involved in
any unfunded pension scheme is usually higher for married women than for their
husbands. Based on a simple theoretical modelling and simulations regarding
implicit tax rates in the German public pension scheme, Section 2 explains that
this “gender tax gap” is mainly due to the way how, in this scheme, survivor ben-
eﬁts partially oﬀ-set the women’s individual, non-derived beneﬁt entitlements.3
3If survivor beneﬁts were absent, implicit tax rates falling on women should, ceteris paribus,
be lower than those for males. At least, this is what should be expected to result from higher
3In the light of empirical estimates regarding the wage elasticity of labour supply
for women and men, Section 3 investigates whether this particular tax struc-
ture could be in line with the fundamental rules of an optimal taxation of wage
earnings. Since the result is negative, Section 4 discusses a possible solution
that would make the incentive problem disappear but still provides an option
for married couples to secure a level of pension beneﬁts for the surviving spouse
which may exceed his or her own, non-derived beneﬁt entitlements. Section 5
concludes.
Note that the considerations made in this paper are not exclusively relevant
for Germany only. The speciﬁc rules applied in other countries are diﬀerent
from the German ones. In most cases, however, the tax structure that they gen-
erate is similar. U.S. Social Security, for instance, with its weaker link between
contributions and pension beneﬁts implies that implicit tax rates vary inversely
with life-time earnings. This should reduce the diﬀerence between tax rates for
primary earners and secondary earners, but need not make it disappear. In
addition, Social Security oﬀers “spouse beneﬁts” for dependant partners that
are payable while the insured individual is still alive. As they also substitute
for own beneﬁt entitlements of second earners (on a one-for-one basis), they can
strongly increase implicit tax rates for married women when compared to those
of their husbands (see, for instance, Blau 1997).
For parallel reasons, even the UK State Pension system, with ﬂat-rate bene-
ﬁts that are only diﬀerentiated by the number of qualifying years, involves some
elements of an extra-tax for married women. Paying the minimum amount
of contributions for a given year to become covered may not make sense for
women whose resulting beneﬁt entitlements are too small to become eﬀective
i nt h ep r e s e n c eo fs p o u s eb e n e ﬁts, which also exist here, and survivor beneﬁts.
Only in a pension system where beneﬁts are entirely lump-sum, not even dif-
ferentiated pro rata temporis, implicit tax rates were always equal to (explicit)
contribution rates and, hence, uniform across all members of a given age cohort,
including married spouses (while beneﬁts are a pure transfer).
2S u r v i v o r b e n e ﬁts and the tax implied in pub-
lic pay-as-you-go pensions
In a stylized model that concentrates on what is essential for the following dis-
cussion, average households are considered to be composed of two individuals
(married to each other), one a male (m) and the other a female (f). The two
types of individuals are diﬀerentiated by their life expectancy while in retire-
ment. In each case, the expected lenght of the retirement period is measured
as a fraction α of the (ﬁxed) length of the active period of life. It is assumed
that αf > αm,w i t h0 < αi < 1, i ∈ {m,f}. In other words, the contingent
life expectancy of a woman entering retirement is higher than that of her hus-
life expectancy of females if contribution rates are uniform and annual beneﬁts are assessed
in a uniform way.
4band. For simplicity, mortality risks while still being active are ignored here;
diﬀerences between the two spouses regarding their age or the timing of their
retirement could be reﬂected, up to a point, in the diﬀerentiation of α.
In the literature, several approaches have been suggested to model labour
supply and other decisions taken by married partners (cf. Killingsworth 1983;
Killingsworth and Heckman 1986; Blundell and MaCurdy 1999). So far, ev-
idence regarding the empirical content of all the competing models is mixed
(ibid.). However, the problem addressed in this paper is relevant, more or less,
under any of the existing approaches. We will therefore pay attention to what
we consider the two limiting cases, viz. a “male-chauvinist” model of household
labour supply (Bowen and Finegan 1969) and a “unitary” model in which labour
supply is based on joint utility maximization of the two spouses (Ashenfelter
and Heckman 1974). As far as labour supply is concerned, the large variety of
“collective” or “interactive” approaches to modelling household-level decisions
(see, e.g., Chiappori 1992; Ott 1992; or Browning et al. 1994) can simply be
taken to represent intermediate solutions between these polar cases. Beyond
that, we do not bother to give the multi-dimensional intra-household decision
problem much structure.
2.1 The “male-chauvinist” model
In this type of model, the two spouses are assumed to maximize their utili-
ties independently, with relatively ﬁxed, traditional role assignments. In other
words, the husband moves ﬁrst in terms of his labour-supply decision, while
the wife chooses her labour supply taking as given the husband’s labour supply
and net life-time earnings. Household labour supply can therefore be analyzed



































Here, the wife’s utility is a function of goods consumed during her active life span




t+1, respectively,4 and leisure consumed
while she is still active, 1−l
f
t . The intertemporal budget constraint states that
goods consumption in periods t and t +1must be nourished from net life-time
earnings of both spouses that are determined by their gross wage rates, Wi
t,
labour supply, li
t, the contribution rate of the pension scheme, τt, and pension
beneﬁts accruing in the retirement period, pi
t+1.5 From the wife’s perspective,
the husband represents something like a ﬁxed asset and his net life-time earnings
4Assuming that the wife eﬀectively controls the household’s goods consumption, variables
c and z could also be taken to represent aggregates across the household.
5To make period-t +1amounts of money comparable to those in period t,t h e ya r ed i s -
counted by the interest factor 1+rt+1.
5(or an exogenously determined share of these) are equivalent to some kind of
non-labour income.
If we want to look at individual labour-supply decisions that are taken se-
quentially by each partner — the husband taking the lead — and see how these can
be inﬂu e n c e db yt h ep e n s i o ns y s t e m ,w eh a v et os p e l lo u tm o r ef u l l yh o wb e n -
eﬁt entitlements are deﬁned. In a pay-as-you-go pension scheme that strongly
links beneﬁts to earlier contributions, such as the German Statutory Pension
Scheme, beneﬁts can be determined based on a factor reﬂecting the internal rate
of return on contributions, 1+ρt+1, which should be uniform across insured in-
dividuals belonging to the same age cohort. In addition, what matters for the
size of pi
t+1 is (i) the length of the retirement period, hence life expectancy αi;
(ii) the deﬁnition of survivor beneﬁts that are derived from beneﬁt entitlements
of the partner faced with shorter life expectancy; and (iii) the rules that govern
what happens when own, non-derived pension entitlements for the surviving
partner and survivor beneﬁts coincide. In the following, we assume the relevant
structure of beneﬁts to be as follows:
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Pension beneﬁts that can be attributed to the husband’s contributions, pm
t+1,
include his own old-age pension beneﬁts paid out in period αm as well as derived
survivor beneﬁts paid for another period αf − αm. The latter are deﬁned as a
fraction of 0 < γ < 1 of the original beneﬁts, in line with the German system
where current rules set a corresponding factor at 0.55. As long as the husband
is still alive, his wife is entitled to receive old-age pension beneﬁts that are
only linked to her own contributions. Once she is widowed, however, her own
beneﬁt entitlements are reduced against survivor beneﬁts that are also becoming
eﬀective. The one-for-one reduction that is assumed in (3) overstates the actual
rules applied in Germany,6 but the results are qualitatively unaﬀected by this
simpliﬁcation.
However, we need to distinguish between two cases now: If the widow’s own
beneﬁt entitlements turn out to be smaller than the survivor beneﬁts included







t , with the limiting case of a women who never worked in the




t =0 ); if own beneﬁt entitlements exceed the








Using (2) and (3) to determine eﬀective net wage rates wi
t for both spouses,
taking into account not only contributions paid to the pension scheme but also
6Currently, the German pension law deﬁnes a threshold amount of own beneﬁt entitlements
that are exempted from the reduction. This threshold amount is diﬀerentiated between West
and East Germany and increases with the number of children the survivor has raised. Higher
beneﬁts are reduced by 40% per Euro of survivor beneﬁts that the individual is entitled to
receive as well.

















































The terms τt(1 − ...) included in (4) to (6) represent diﬀerentiated rates of an
“implicit” (wage) tax that is next to automatically imposed on insured individu-
als through their mandatory participation in a pay-as-you-go pension scheme.7
In a system with earnings-related beneﬁts, these tax rates are positive, but
smaller than contribution rates, mainly because the internal rate of return, ρt+1,
is usually smaller than the interest rate, rt+1, used for discounting. The speciﬁc
formulae obtained here incorporate the system of survivor beneﬁts sketched be-
fore. In the following, we will call these implicit tax rates — in the order of their







Case 1 (“f1”) implies that the widow’s own beneﬁt entitlements become
immaterial during the period of survivorhood. For a woman falling in this
category, the implicit tax rate will therefore be strictly higher than in case 2
(“f2”), where individual, non-derived beneﬁt entitlements are not entirely oﬀ-set
through survivor beneﬁts. In this latter case, the implicit tax rate will decrease





exceed the amount of γWm
t lm





t →∞ , the rate converges to the implicit tax rate for an unmarried woman,
the latter being only determined by her life expectancy.8
What is more interesting, however, is a comparison between implicit tax


























In other words, implicit tax rates for married women will always be higher than
those for their husbands if the survivor-beneﬁt factor exceeds the women’s share




t would have to be
122.2% of Wm
t lm
t for this condition to become binding. Taking the current
7For an in-depth discussion of the concept of “implicit taxes” involved in pay-as-you-go
public pension schemes, see Fenge and Werding (2003).
8In our framework, and assuming that the life expectancy of females is not aﬀected by













7relative female—male wage rates displayed in Figure 1 (75% to 70%)a sar o u g h
approximation for the ratios of earnings in an average household — still neglecting
typical diﬀerences in the life-time amount of labour supplied by married women
and men that continue to exist — there is considerable leeway before the above
condition will be violated in more than a few exceptional cases.
2.2 The “unitary” model and other approaches
The case we want to establish against the traditional way of deﬁning survivor
beneﬁts appears to be the strongest in the context of the “male-chauvinist”
model of labour supply discussed in the previous sub-section. But alternative
approaches to modelling labour supply at the household level, where partners
actively share their resources based on the individual wi
ts or where their utility
functions are directly linked to each other, lead to diﬀerentiated tax schedules
that do not fully remove our problem.
As another limiting case, one could assume the two spouses to maximize their
utilities in such a way that this can be represented by a “unitary” household
utility function and a budget constraint aggregated across the household:
max
c,z,lm,lfut = u(ct,z t+1,1 − lm






















Here, changes in the structure of pension beneﬁts that are associated with alter-
native choices regarding lm and lf directly oﬀ-set each other within the couple’s
joint life-time budget constraint.


























Now, husbands and wives alike are (mutually) aﬀected by the distinction of

















































































Type-1 women (i.e., those with relatively low life-time earnings) are still faced
with a higher tax rate than their husbands, while type-2 women (with earnings
that exceed γWm
t lm









t , so that the results in terms of implicit tax
rates are unaﬀected by the choice of an alternative modelling approach for case-
1 couples. In case 2, however, the diﬀerentiated tax rates imposed on married
partners eﬀectively align to those arising purely from diﬀerences in individual
life expectancies.
Speaking more generally and covering, in a rough fashion, a whole range of
solutions in between the two extremes we have discussed here, we may therefore
state the following. Survivor beneﬁt sa n dt h ew a yt h e yi n t e r f e r ew i t hi n d i -
vidual, non-derived beneﬁt entitlements tend to increase the implicit tax rates
m a r r i e dw o m e na r ef a c e dw i t hw h e np a r t i c i p a t i n gi np u b l i cp a y - a s - y o u - g op e n -
sion schemes over those imposed on their husbands. If spouses employ a sharing
rule for their resources that is contingent on their eﬀective net wages, or if they
directly interact with each other when maximizing their utilities, this “gender
tax gap” may decrease. In the limit, the implicit tax rate for women can even
become smaller than that for their husbands, but this only happens if labour
supply and earnings of these women are relatively high.
Now, what do these overall ﬁndings tell us? It is not uncommon to think of
taxation as the deﬁnition of a tax schedule by which indiduals self-select into
diﬀerent categories of tax-payers through their behaviour, eﬀectively picking
their tax rate. For instance, this is what happens in a progressive income tax
schedule implying higher tax rates for individuals who decide to work longer
hours or to acquire higher qualiﬁcations. But the case considered here appears
to be diﬀerent. To the extent that the various approaches to modelling mar-
ried couples’ decision-making reﬂect actual diﬀerences in how two partners live
together (and not just unresolved ambiguities in applying simple maths to a
complex reality), the diﬀerentiation of implicit tax rates in public pay-as-you-go
pensions is not so much based on individual behaviour that is directly linked
to earnings capacities at the individual or household level. Instead, it partly
arises from how individuals interact with each other regarding a broad array
of household-level decisions. Also, reducing tax rates for married, high-earner
women with closer ties to their partners, while increasing those for their hus-
bands, does not appear to be a meaningful (self-)selection strategy that should
be built in a well-designed tax schedule. What is most questionable, however,
is the fundamental upward trend in implicit tax rates for married women that
is due to the conventional way of assessing survivor beneﬁts as such.
92.3 Implicit tax rates in the German public pension scheme
The result that the implicit tax rate involved in public pay-as-you-go pensions is
often higher for married women than for their husbands is not an artifact of our
simpliﬁed model. This can be conﬁrmed by simulations which incorporate the
actual rules of how surivor beneﬁts are being assessed in Germany. Amending
earlier calculations which focused on implicit tax rates for (male) individuals
acting as “principal earners” of their households (Thum and Weizsäcker 2000;
Fenge and Werding 2004),9 we construct stylized earnings proﬁles for their wives
reﬂecting on-going changes in average female labour-force participation and in
the average gender wage gap for each year covered by the simulations;10 we also
take into account that married women are usually younger than their husbands






























Married men                          
(''standard pensioners'')
Married women (average fem.
LFP rate; average earnings)
     * In percent of life-time gross earnings.                                        Source: CESifo Pension Model (Version 2004).    
Fig. 2: Implicit taxes in the German Statutory Pension Scheme for married
individuals (born 1937—2001)
The simulation results exhibited in Figure 2 add a little more detail to our
theoretical observations. In particular, they show that, mainly because of their
higher life expectancy, implicit tax rates for married women can be lower than
those for men as long as their own beneﬁt entitlements are so small that they
are exempted, fully or to a large extent, from the reduction against survivor
9The simulations presented here also take into account the most recent pension reform
enacted in 2004.
10For the future development of female labour-force participation, we use a scenario that
is based on assumptions made for a number of long-term simulations commissioned by the
German government (see Werding and Kaltschütz 2005). Regarding the wage gap, we assume
that is goes down from a current 25% (blue-collar workers in manufacturing, see Figure 1) to
about 15% until 2050.
10beneﬁts. But as female labour-force participation increases and the gender wage
gap shrinks, the reduction of own beneﬁt entitlements during survivorhood is
likely to increase implicit tax rates for married women — in the graph: for
average women born starting from 1965 — beyond those for their husbands. In
these simulations, ambiguities regarding how to allocate survivor beneﬁts — to
husbands or to wives, being oﬀ-set by their non-derived beneﬁt entitlements
in the latter case — never arise because, throughout, an average woman’s own
pension beneﬁts are not high enough to escape the marginal reduction against
survivor beneﬁts.
3 Optimal taxation and the gender tax gap
3.1 Optimum taxation rules
It should be noted that the existence of an implicit tax rate per se —e v e n
its increasing time trend that shows up in the simulations run for Figure 2
— is not necessarily indicating a fundamental ineﬃciency involved in pay-as-
you-go pension schemes,11 even if it is suited to discourage insured individuals,
irrespective of their gender, from labour-force participation. What is potentially
problematic here, however, is the tax structure derived in the previous section,
with tax rates that tend to be systematically higher for married women than
for their husbands.
Basically, implicit tax rates are an instrument required for keeping the im-
plicit debt involved in pay-as-you-go pensions — i.e., the present value of out-
standing beneﬁts that are linked to all past and present contributions — on a
sustainable time path. To avoid that this debt explodes as a percentage of cur-
rent GDP, the internal rate of return on contributions must fall short of the
market rate of interest over the long run. By its demographic and economic
fundamentals, ρt+1 is generally restricted to the growth rate of the economy’s
aggregate payroll, or total taxable wage earnings, such that the above condition
should be met.12
Considerations of this kind ﬁx the implicit tax which has to be imposed
on a given age cohort participating in a pay-as-you-go pension scheme as an
absolute amount. In terms of our model — assuming, for simplicity, that all











t = Tt. (13)
11Cf. the seminal papers by Breyer (1989) and Fenge (1995). Sinn (2000) surveys the
entire debate on the eﬃciency of unfunded pension systems that has been triggered by these
contributions. The implications of increasing tax rates for younger age cohorts that are mainly
due to current demographic change are discussed in Fenge and Werding (2004).
12Considered in a little more detail, the relevant ρ for each cohort that is covered in a
pay-as-you-go pension scheme is determined by average participation rates (in our model: li
t
and li
t+1), average wages (Wi
t and Wi
t+1), and the dependency ratio (αm and αf), modiﬁed
by potential changes of the contribution rate (τt+1 against τt). Note that, as li is always
a cohort-wide average in this calculation, ρ can safely be taken to be given for each insured
individual.
11I tr e m a i n sa no p e nq u e s t i o n ,t h o u g h ,w h i ch structure of tax rates — here: what
ϑ
i
ts — should ideally be chosen to yield the tax revenue T.
This question is simply another application of the theory of optimal taxation
that investigates the design of tax rates by which a given amount of tax revenue
c a nb el e v i e di ns u c haw a yt h a tw e l f a r el o s s e si m p o s e do nt h ei n d i v i d u a l s
aﬀected are minimized. Important standard results that are relevant here were
already provided by Sandmo (1974; 1987) or Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, ch.
12). An application to implicit taxes involved in public pay-as-you-go pension
schemes can be found in Fenge, Uebelmesser and Werding (2002). This paper
and its recent up-date, Fenge, Uebelmesser and Werding (2005), also include an
empirical assessment on which we can build in the following.
Formally speaking, within the framework of the models considered in Section




t ,a s s u m -
ing that the government maximizes utilities of the individuals aﬀected, taking
into account the relevant (household) budget constraint and the additional con-
straint (13) regarding the tax revenue that is required. The precise approach















t ) and condition (13),








But the ﬁnal results are basically the same under both approaches. Here, vf and
v are the indirect utility functions that can be derived from problems (1) and
(7), respectively. In (14), the wife’s utility is maximized holding constant the
husband’s indirect utility vm and tax revenue T, while in (15), T = T represents
the only constraint.
From the “male-chauvinist model”, after a series of conventional re-arrangements,











According to condition (16), implicit tax rates for married women, ϑ
f,s h o u l d
be higher than those for men, ϑ
m,13 if the (compensated) wage elasticity of
female labour supply, εf, is lower than the corresponding value for males, εm,
and vice versa.I n o t h e r w o r d s , t o l i m i t e ﬃciency losses arising from labour-
supply responses, the tax rate imposed on the partner whose labour supply is
13The transformation to ϑi/(1 −ϑi) simply relates the tax rate to net earnings, expressing
it as a proportional surcharge on these.
12more elastic should always be lower than the tax rate for the partner whose
labour supply is relatively inelastic.
From the “unitary model”, imposing no further restrictions, notably with
respect to the form of the utility function, we ﬁrst obtain a variant of the











Condition (17) states, again, that ϑ
f should be higher than ϑ
m if the women’s
labour supply is less elastic than that of their husbands, and if this relation
between “own-price eﬀects” (where the wage elasticity is evaluated with respect
to one’s own wages, indexed ii) is not turned over through a highly inverse
relation of “cross-price eﬀects”, εij,w i t hi,j ∈ {m,f}, i 6= j (measuring the
elasticity of labour supply with respect to the spouse’s wage).14 Assuming, in
ac o m m o ns i m p l i ﬁcation, that household utility (7) is fully separable regarding
the labour-supply decisions of each partner, so that cross-price elasticities are
zero, (17) simpliﬁes to (16). Again, it is only the ratio of (own-)wage elasticities,
εm and εf, that determines the optimal tax structure.
3.2 The empirical side
Theoretical considerations alone are not suited to clarify what these optimal-
taxation rules actually imply for our problem. It is ultimately an empirical
question whose labour supply is typically more elastic with respect to net wages,
hence wage taxation: that of married women or of their husbands. Exploring
a related, yet diﬀering, subject — namely the question of optimal time-proﬁles
of implicit tax rates over individual life cycles (with more than just one active
period) — Fenge, Uebelmesser and Werding (2002; 2005) come up with parallel
assessments for the labour supply elasticities of married females and males.
Their results are thus also of high interest in the current context.
The analysis of labour supply of German males and (married) females con-
ducted in Fenge, Uebelmesser and Werding (2005) is based on data collected
through the “German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)” between 1991 and 2002.
Self-employed individuals and civil servants are excluded from the sample as,
under current rules, they are exempted from mandatory membership in the Ger-
man Statutory Pension Scheme. Diﬀerentiated by gender, the data are pooled
to form two sub-samples of “young” and “old” working-age individuals (aged
20—39 and 40—59, respectively). For the purpose of the present paper, this al-
lows for a rough, but meaningful, control for potential cohort eﬀects that may be
present especially in female labour supply decisions. Labour supply is deﬁned
in terms of decisions on working hours, assuming that the more fundamental
14Taken in isolation, these cross-price eﬀects have the following impact: implicit tax rates
for females should be higher than those for males if the compensated elasticity of labour supply
of women with respect to their husbands’ wages is lower than the “cross-wage” elasticity of
labour supply of men — and vice versa.
13decision to participate in the labour market will often be inﬂuenced by other
considerations — rigidities in the length of certain training periods for younger
individuals, the supply of child-care facilities for females, options to exit from
the labour market and retire early for older workers, etc. The econometric es-
timates are based on the standard two-stage procedure suggested by Heckman
(1979), where ﬁrst a (gross) wage equation is estimated to impute wages for
those who are not actually working, then a Tobit model (after Tobin 1958) for
the unbiased labour supply function based on changes in net earnings.15
Building on the coeﬃcients of these estimates — those for the net wage as-
sociated with an extra-hour of work and for other household income — one can
calculate the compensated wage elasticities of labour supply through a Slut-
sky decomposition of observable, uncompensated wage elasticities.16 Table 1
summarizes the main results, comparing wage elasticities of labour supply for
married females and males and confronting them with average implicit tax rates
for “young” (“y”) and “old” (“o”) individuals of working age that can be derived
from the simulations for Figure 2.
Table 1: The structure of wage elasticities
and implicit taxes for married females and males
Wage elasticities Implicit taxes
a) “young” individuals (aged 20—39)
Married females: εf
y =0 .53 ** ϑ
f
y =1 3 .9%
Males: εm
y =0 .01 ϑ
m
















b) “old” individuals (aged 40—59)
Married females: εf























** denotes signiﬁcance at a 5-percent level (assessed using a
bootstrapping technique with 200 re-samplings).
Source: Fenge, Uebelmesser and Werding (2005, Tables 3 and 6).
It turns out that, in both age categories, labour supply of married women is
much more elastic than that of men of the same age. This is most apparent for
young individuals aged 20—39, where male labour supply appears to be virtually
15For a comprehensive description of the data set and the methods applied, together with
a fuller documentation of the results, see Fenge, Uebelmesser and Werding (2005, Sections 4
and 5).
16See Fenge, Uebelmesser and Werding (2005, Section 6).
14non-responsive to wages. For older individuals aged 40—59, the wage elasticity
of male labour supply increases a lot more against the parallel ﬁgure for the
young than it does in the case of married women. Yet, it remains well below
the wage elasticity of females of the same age. All in all, the basic result that
labour supply decisions of women are much more responsive to wages than those
of men neither appears to be mainly driven by cohort eﬀects nor by life-cycle
eﬀects.17 Moreover, it is a consistent ﬁnding in a multitude of earlier studies
covering Germany and other industrialized countries.18
Table 1 also shows that, for the birth cohorts and the time period actu-
ally covered through the estimates, implicit tax rates involved in the German
Statutory Pension Scheme are indeed a little higher for women than for males
in the same age categories. As a result, the ratio of the relevant tax rates (per
net earnings) for females vs males is far from what would appear to be optimal
to take care of the huge diﬀerences in labour-supply reactions. In the case of
younger individuals, this ratio would have to be adjusted by a factor of less than
1/50, in the case of older individuals by a factor of about 1/3, in order to bring
it in line with the simple inverse-elasticities rule (16).
It might eﬀectively over-burden the results presented here to derive an “op-
timal” structure of ϑ
is in a quantitatively exact fashion. For this kind of pur-
pose, the empirical design is certainly a bit too rough, neglecting inter alia the
slightly diﬀering implications of diﬀerent approaches to modelling household-
level decisions. (For instance, cross-wage elasticities of each partner’s labour
supply that could diﬀer from zero are neglected.) Furthermore, we only look
at implicit taxes involved in the pension system, not at other taxes imposed
on wage earnings. (Note, however, that the German “splitting” approach to
jointly taxing a married couple’s income also implies a tendency towards higher
tax rates for second earners — mostly women — than for typical breadwinner-
males; see Zameck 1997). What the results should be taken to indicate is that
the gender-speciﬁc structure of implicit taxes involved in pay-as-you-go pension
schemes most likely violates fundamental rules of optimal taxation and that this
is mainly a by-product of how survivor beneﬁts interact with the survivor’s own,
non-derived pension entitlements. As a consequence, implicit tax rates imposed
on married women should be reduced below the comparable tax rates for men
— only, we would possibly over-state our case if we wanted to say by how much.
17This is largely conﬁrmed by a series of more diﬀerentiated estimates for sub-groups of 5
age cohorts each that are also reported in Fenge, Uebelmesser and Werding (2005, Figure 4
and Table 5).
18The estimates provided by Franz (1985), Strøm and Wagenhals (1991) or Untiedt (1992)
focus on female labour supply; they support that wage elasticities of women are considerably
high, but do not allow for comparisons with those of men. The studies by Buslei and Steiner
(1999), Kaltenborn (2000) or Steiner and Wrohlich (2004) clearly conﬁrm our results. For a
comparative survey of parallel results obtained for other countries, see Blundell and MaCurdy
(1999, Sections 6.8, 7.3 and 8.4).
154 Options for reforming survivor beneﬁts
The problems highlighted in this paper are mainly due to the fact that survivor
beneﬁts usually substitute for pension entitlements that are based on the sur-
vivor’s own contributions. If, under current socio-economic conditions, survivor
beneﬁts are also less and less justiﬁed by distributional objectives, abolishing
them might appear to be a natural solution.19 So far, the only industrialized
country that has moved in this direction appears to be Sweden (in 1990), the
main reason being that high labour-force participation rates of (married) women
in this country had made special provisions seemingly redundant.20
Here, we will take up this idea when addressing the policy implications of our
considerations (“step 1”) and amend it with a second feature that is also inspired
by an element of the current Swedish pension system: joint annuitization of a
couple’s individual beneﬁt entitlements (“step 2”). The latter has been included,
as an option, in the new Swedish Premium Pension Scheme established in 2000,
an additional mandatory pillar that is fully-funded and located exactly at the
border-line between public and private provision.
4.1 Step 1: Abolishing survivor beneﬁts
Abolishing survivor pensions implies that net wages and implicit tax rates for







































t because αf > αm.
As long as life expectancies of women are higher than those of men, the implicit
tax rates they are faced with would unambiguously move in a direction that
should lead to smaller welfare losses in the light of standard estimates regard-
ing the diﬀerences in wage elasticities of female vs male labour supply. When
assessed by the strict inverse-elasticity rule as stated in Section 3, the solution
is not necessarily optimal. But we already said that one should be reluctant to
take the simulations and estimates presented here as a precise yardstick for the
reforms that are necessary.
Compared to the status quo, a solution of this kind implies ﬁnancial losses in
terms of a given couple’s joint beneﬁt entitlements if, according to the distinction
introduced in Section 2, the household belongs to “case 1”. There would be no
19As they are not aﬀected by the criticisms raised here, this conclusion need not apply to
survivor beneﬁts paid to partners of working age who are prevented from (full) labour-force
participation through child-care obligations, at least for a certain period of time.
20Since then, survivor beneﬁts in the Swedish public pension scheme are strongly means-
tested and, as a rule, only paid for a few months of re-orientation after the contingency arises.
16such loss in “case 2” if the diﬀerent types of beneﬁts oﬀ-set each other on a one-
for-one basis. Since part of the beneﬁts is often exempted from the reduction,
and since reduction rates can be smaller than 100%, total beneﬁt entitlements
would also decrease for case-2 households if survivor beneﬁts were wiped out.
On the other hand, these losses for married couples may eﬀectively indicate that
an out-dated type of extra-beneﬁts is abolished, allowing for reductions in the
pension system’s total budget.
Fully individualizing beneﬁt entitlements for married spouses cannot be
achieved without approporiate transition periods. Otherwise, the reforms could
annihilate life-cycle planning of married couples, especially of female partners
in marriages with a traditional division of labour, at a very late stage. For
individuals who have failed to build up suﬃcient pension entitlements of their
own from the very beginning, it would be diﬃcult to make up for that through
behavioural changes already when there is still some time to go until retirement.
Increasing pension beneﬁts for women whose individual beneﬁte n t i t l e m e n t sa r e
small because of parental leaves — a requirement deﬁned by the German Court
of Justice in 1992 with respect to any future pension reform — may solve this
problem partially but not fully.21
A lasting shortcoming of this type of a solution is that the resulting time pro-
ﬁle of household income over the periods of joint retirement and survivorhood —
w h e nt h es u r v i v i n gs p o u s ew o u l dh a v et ol i v eo nh i so rh e ro w nb e n e ﬁt entitle-
ments even if these are rather small — may not at all correspond to a proﬁle that
is optimal in terms of the timing of goods consumption and the relevant inter-
temporal substitution elasticities. For an average couple, the ratio between the
sum of both spouses’ individual beneﬁt entitlements and the female partner’s
beneﬁt entitlements that are eﬀective during the period of survivorhood will
typically be in the range of 100 to 30.
This problem is mitigated, but not fully removed, through the new option of
continously splitting invidual pension entitlements between the two partners on
a 50-to-50 basis that was introduced through the German 2001 pension reform.22
The result is a 100-to-50 ratio between beneﬁt entitlements during the sub-
periods of joint survival and survivorhood, respectively Existing rules for the
deﬁnition of survivor beneﬁts are mainly based on factors (for the conversion of
beneﬁt entitlements of defunct spouses into survivor beneﬁts) between 50 and
60%, additionally exempting part of the survivor’s own entitlements from being
r e d u c e di nr e t u r n . 23 In other words, they appear to be targeted at a 100-to-60
(or higher) ratio between beneﬁts accruing in both sub-periods of retirement.
21The solution suggested in the remainder of this paper is thus open to being augmented
by additional changes in the way child-rearing activities are reﬂected in individual pension
entitlements. Proposals of this kind for the German Statutory Pension Scheme are made in
Sinn and Werding (2000; 2005) and Sinn (2005).
22The option is given to couples who married after 1 January 2001, or where both spouses
were born after 1 January 1962. At the same time, couples who use it have to give up their
entitlements for receiving survivor beneﬁts. So far, this option is used very rarely.
23See Fenge et al. (2003, Table 1.15). In Germany, the conversion factor is currently 55%,
as was mentioned in Section 2. Until 2000, it was 60% and, on average, the recent reduction is
oﬀ-set by higher exemptions for own beneﬁt entitlements of survivors who have raised children.
17Apart from that, the “splitting” solution does not appear to be ideal for
a number of other reasons. The splitting option is just a small step towards
removing the eﬃciency loss indicated by our results presented in Section 3 as
it exactly equalizes implicit tax rates for married females and their husbands.24
Also, if it were chosen by a large number of households, part of the potential
reductions in pension expenditure through the abolishment of survivor beneﬁts
would not materialize because entitlements are typically transferred from males
— with higher life-time earnings but lower life expectancy — to their wives. Fi-
nally, the simple splitting model may be too rigid in the allocation of the pooled
beneﬁt entitlements of a given couple both to the partners and over time. Even
a model with variable splitting factors, where spouses can freely choose how
much of their beneﬁt entitlements to transfer between them, may not be suited
to insure the basic biometrical risks — which of the partners will outlive the
other, and by how long? — on which the problem of an adequate provision for
survivors ultimately rests.
4.2 Step 2: Joint annuitization
A solution that is superior in terms of the ﬂexibility of re-allocating individual
beneﬁt entitlements, the insurance of life-expectancy risks, as well as the ﬁscal
costs is given by a joint annuitization of a couple’s individual beneﬁt entitle-
ments. The basic idea behind this solution is that, applying actuarial principles
and without granting any extra-beneﬁts to survivors, the present value of a mar-
ried couple’s pooled beneﬁt entitlements can be shifted rather freely between
the sub-periods of joint retirement and survivorhood. Compared to the case
where beneﬁt entitlements are fully individualized, beneﬁts paid out while both
partners are still alive would have to be reduced by a certain margin, in order to
t o pu pp e n s i o nb e n e ﬁts for the survivant spouse later on. In both sub-periods,
public pensions could then cover an equivalent share of current consumption,
ﬁrst of the couple, then of the single survivor. A solution of this kind can be
realized through the simple choice of just one parameter that governs the rele-
vant deductions and top-ups at each point in time. If the pool of risks is large
enough, insurance against deviations of individual life expectancies and the ac-
tual sequence of deaths from what had to be expected can be easily provided.
The core parameter of the joint-annuitization model is a deduction rate
δ by which beneﬁts actually paid out during joint survival are reduced, thus
allowing for higher beneﬁt payments to the survivor later on. The present value
of expected total beneﬁts of a given couple has to remain unchanged against
as c e n a r i ow h e r eb e n e ﬁt entitlements are purely individual. This implies that
the incentive eﬀects of joint annuitization with respect to each partner’s labour-
supply decisions are the same as those associated with equations (18) and (19).
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18Within the framework developed in Section 2 — where life expectancies of
males and females were taken to be ﬁxed and the time structure was modelled
in a rough fashion only — shifting beneﬁt entitlements between the periods of
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By the choice of δ, the increase in pension beneﬁts during the period of survivor-
hood, αf − αm, exactly corresponds to the deduction accepted by the partners
during their joint retirement period, αm, on present-value terms.
How should δ be chosen in order to establish the partners’ preferred time
proﬁle of current beneﬁt payments over the full retirement period? Obviously,
this is dependent on the relative size of their individual beneﬁte n t i t l e m e n t s( a n d
other sources of old-age income) as well as the actual diﬀerence between their
contingent life expectancies at the moment of joint annuitization. Based on
equation (20), but correcting for the expected length of the relevant sub-periods
to estimate the relative size of current (“annual”) beneﬁts, we can deﬁne the




















αf − αm (21)
Assuming that beneﬁts are jointly annuitized when both partners enter retire-
ment (simultaneously) and calibrating the αis based on actual values for the
average duration of pension beneﬁts paid to men and women in the German
Statutory Pension Scheme,25 Table 2 shows the results for π (ratio of beneﬁts
paid to the survivor over beneﬁts paid to the couple during joint survival) as
a function of the relative amounts of life-time earnings, hence beneﬁt entitle-
ments, and alternative choices regarding the deduction rate δ.I tt u r n so u tt h a t
relatively small deductions during joint survival are suﬃcient to ensure a rela-
tive level of pension beneﬁts corresponding to what current rules for survivor
beneﬁts are meant to provide for (π ≥ 60% being a widely-accepted target level,
irrespective of whether the survivant spouse holds own beneﬁt entitlements or
not). It should not be surprising that it is the easier to get into this range of πs
the higher are individual beneﬁt entitlements of the surviving partner.
25In West-Germany, the corresponding value for males is 14.6 years, for females 18.8 years
(see Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungsträger, 2004).
19T a b l e2 :R e l a t i v el e v e lo fb e n e ﬁts for survivors (π)
δ =
Wflf/Wmlm 0.025 0.05 0.075 0.1 0.15
0.00 8.9% 18.3% 28.2% 38.6% 61.3%
0.25 29.4% 39.3% 49.8% 60.8% 84.9%
0.50 43.1% 53.4% 64.2% 75.7% 100.6%
0.75 52.9% 63.4% 74.5% 86.2% 111.8%
1.00 60.2% 70.9% 82.2% 94.2% 120.2%
In reality, there are a number of additional complications for the solution
sketched here to be workable which are not covered by the simple model devel-
oped in Section 2. First, the partners could retire at diﬀerent points in time.
Basically, (outstanding) pension entitlements of a married couple can be jointly
annuitized at any point in time during their retirement phase. The eﬀect of
δ becomes weaker the shorter contingent life expectancy of the partner who is
likely to die ﬁrst. But the re-assessment of beneﬁts can be easily done when the
ﬁrst of the spouses enters retirement as well as when the second one retires.
Second, life expectancy of females is higher than that of males in all industri-
alized countries, and married women are typically younger than their husbands
almost everywhere. Still, in individual cases it is perfectly possible that it is the
man who lives longer than his wife. If joint annuitization were only made in the
light of the opposite case, this could lead to an over-provision for the surviving
husband and a sub-optimal structure of consumption over the full retirement
period. But if mortality rates are known for both partners, the choice of δ can
be translated into a choice of the relative level of beneﬁts, π, or a preferred
time proﬁle of paying out pm∗
t+1 +p
f∗
t+1 which should then be considered the true
objective of insurance, irrespective of the actual sequence of deaths.
Third, the retirement period also has a certain length and time structure,
a feature that is captured by our model only in a rough fashion. In reality,
the question arises which discount rate should be used for assessing deductions
and top-ups: the capital-market rate of interest (adjusted for a risk premium
associated with an insurance of longevity risks) or, more in line with how a
pay-as-you-go scheme is actually operated, the pension scheme’s internal rate
of return? By actuarial standards, the ﬁrst of these options is certainly more
appropriate. Also, it is the only solution that is really neutral regarding the
choice of the timing of beneﬁt payments. On the other hand, turning regular
old-age pensions into top-ups for survivors at a market rate of interest implies
that, when aggregated over time, total pension expenditure increases since top-
ups paid during the survivorhood period are higher than earlier deductions by
a rate that exceeds the fundamental growth rate of the pension budget.
It was already mentioned that, probably following a longer transition period,
abolishing traditional survivor beneﬁts should deﬁnitely reduce total pension ex-
20penditure. If, in addition, paying out part of the individual beneﬁt entitlements
of married spouses were postponed until the period of survivorhood of just
one partner, there is a further, transitory reduction in expenditure which, on
present-value terms, is exactly oﬀ-set by higher expenditure later on. It would
therefore appear a natural solution to channel these transitory reductions into a
special “survivors’ reserve” (not into transitory reductions of contribution rates
or transitory increases in beneﬁt levels) in order to actually pre-fund for the
beneﬁt entitlements that are simply becoming eﬀective with a delay. If this is
how the scheme were operated, jointly annuitizing pension beneﬁt entitlements
of married couples at a discount rate derived from the capital-market rate of
interest should not cause any budgetary problems.
5C o n c l u s i o n
An aspect that has not been covered yet is whether public intervention is needed
at all with respect to providing for survivors. With any given time proﬁle of
beneﬁt payments, providing for a partner with lower beneﬁt entitlements who
is most likely to outlive the other can in principle also be accomplished through
making private savings or buying appropriate life-insurance cover. But “fram-
ing” these kinds of decisions through some sort of public provision, linked to
a mandatory pension system, may nonetheless be to the advantage of many
individuals, especially if this can be arranged for in a simple way involving
relatively low transaction costs.26 To the extent that this contributes to estab-
lishing consumption proﬁles with higher utility levels, and helps avoiding cases
of under-provision, oﬀering such a scheme could lead to genuine welfare gains.
In the ﬁrst place, however, the problem we have been dealing with in this
paper is not a matter of adequate provisions and other distributional concerns.
Abolishing traditional survivor beneﬁts and replacing them with a ﬂexible ap-
proach to jointly annuitizing individual beneﬁt entitlements for married couples
is mainly meant to solve the incentive problem worked out in Sections 2 and
3. It is unclear whether the proposal would perfectly solve this problem as it
reduces the level of implicit tax rates for women below the one for men, but
not necessarily to the extent that might be required considering the enormous
diﬀerences in their wage elasticities of labour supply. On the other hand, we
would like to repeat that the estimates we have referred to should not be taken
to oﬀer a precise measure for the size of the corrections needed. A reform that
strengthens the role of individual, contributory beneﬁt entitlements, combined
with a joint annuitization scheme for (married) couples, will in any case reduce
the ineﬃciency to which we have been pointing.
26For instance, the beneﬁt administration could go as far as deﬁning a value for δ that
establishes a 100-to-60 ratio for π based on any two spouses’ individual beneﬁt entitlements.
The two partners could then over-rule this preliminary choice through a joint decision provided
that they are able to demonstrate that the resulting time proﬁle of old-age income will not
give rise to other beneﬁt entitlements.
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